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VOID AGREEMENTS, KNOCKED-OUT TERMS,
AND BLUE PENCILS: JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE HANDLING OF UNREASONABLE

TERMS IN NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
Kenneth R. Swift*

I. INTRODUCTION
It's a common scenario, played out numerous times every business
day:
Sam Salesperson is very excited. He has just been offered a
position by ABC Corp., a promising start-up company, to be their
salesperson for their brand new medical software system in the
territories of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The head of human
resources hands him a document entitled "Noncompete
Agreement" and tells him he will need to sign it before he can
officially be hired. Excited about the opportunity ahead,Sam signs
the document, which prohibitshim from working for a competitor
in Pennsylvania or New Jerseyfor one year after he leaves ABC
Corp.
Sam starts work and does a goodjobfor ABC Corp., but then one
day he has a dispute with his boss and leaves to work for a
competitor...
Section II of this article will provide a brief introduction to

employer-employee noncompete agreement 1 analysis and explore the
preliminary issue of consideration. Section III will analyze the criteria

* Legal Writing Instructor, Hamline University School of Law. Special thanks to Tina, Chase, and

Alana.

1. These types of agreements are known by several terms, including "Covenant Not to
Compete" and "Noncompetition Agreement." This article will use the term "noncompete
agreement."
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and differing approaches courts use to determine the validity of a
noncompete agreement, including the requirement of an employer's
legitimate business interest and the reasonableness of the occupational
limitations as well as the geographic and temporal scope of the
agreement. Section IV will survey the current judicial and statutory
responses to unreasonable terms in a noncompete agreement. Sections V
and VI critique the varying approaches and suggest a model statute to
address unreasonable terms in noncompete agreements. This model will
take into account a factor heretofore generally ignored by jurisdictions in
their approach to unreasonable noncompete terms: the relationship
between consideration and the reasonableness of the agreement.
II. OVERVIEW OF NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS

This section first provides a brief introduction to the framework of
noncompete agreement analysis and then explores the differing
approaches jurisdictions use when addressing the preliminary issue of
consideration for a noncompete agreement.
A. Introduction
Noncompete agreements between employers and employees have
been commonplace for over a century.2 While the precise laws

2. See Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Ark. 1999) (noting
that litigation over noncompete agreements has been around for over 500 years); Harlan M. Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 629-46 (1960) (surveying the
development of English common law on noncompete agreements). For a historical perspective of
noncompete agreements in the United States up through the early 1950s, see Arthur Murray Dance
Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687-88 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952) providing a
thorough survey of secondary source materials, which the court colorfully refers to as various "seas"
of periodicals, annotations, encyclopedias, and restatements. See also Zabota Cmty. Ctr. v. Frolova,
No. 061909BLS1, 2006 WL 2089828, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 18, 2006).
The legal history of these kinds of situations or agreements dates back at least to 19th
Century England. Lord Macnaughten reminded his readers that enforcement of these
kinds of agreements is an exception to the general rule. He said:
The public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely: so has the
individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all
restraints of trade (sic] themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public
policy, and therefore void. That is the general rule. But there are exceptions:
restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified
by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a sufficient justification, and
indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable [sic] reasonable,
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controlling the enforceability of these agreements vary from state to
state,3 the following generic standard, applicable in most jurisdictions, 4
provides a useful framework for surveying the basic principles courts
used to determine if a noncompete agreement between an employer and
employee will be upheld:
The test applied is whether or not the restraint is necessary for the
protection of the business or good will of the employer, and if so,
whether the stipulation has imposed upon the employee any greater
restraint than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer's
business, regard being had to the nature and character of the
employment, the time for which the restriction is imposed, and
5 the
territorial extent of the locality to which the prohibition extends.
Most courts also note that the law looks at these contracts with
"disfavor" 6 and subjects them to careful scrutiny.7 This type of verbiage
that is, in reference to the interest of the parties concerned and reasonable in
reference to the interest of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford
adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same
time it is in no way injurious to the public. That, I think, is the fair result of all of
the authorities.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Nordenfelt v. Nordendelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [18941 A.C.
535, 565 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.)).
3. For a thorough compilation of the laws applicable to noncompete agreements and each
jurisdiction, see BRIAN MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE BY STATE SURVEY
(4th ed. 2004). Throughout this article, general propositions will be presented and representative
case law will be cited. This article does not purport to capture the subtle nuances of every
component of noncompete agreement analysis (many of which are based upon the myriad factual
scenarios that develop in employer-employee relationships), particularly in sections two and three,
where each of the sub-sections could be its own subject of a law review article. The Malsberger
book and the ALR articles cited herein provide literally thousands of pages of case law and citations
exploring every facet of noncompete agreement analysis and provide a good starting point for
research on a particular jurisdiction's standards.
4. But see Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in
Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 485 (1990) (contending that the variations amongst the
legal precedents make predictability difficult).
5. Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Minn. 1965); see, e.g., TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002):
Notwithstanding Section 15.05 of this code, and subject to any applicable provision of
Subsection (b), a covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an
otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it
contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained
that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the
goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.
6. See, e.g., Sysco Food Servs. of E. Wis., L.L.C. v. Ziccarelli, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1043
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is common in noncompete cases and makes it clear that courts will not
treat these types of contracts under the same freedom of contract type of
analysis found elsewhere in contract law. 8 Many courts have
characterized these agreements as one of "adhesion." 9
B. Consideration
As a preliminary matter, a noncompete agreement must, as with all
other contracts, be supported by consideration. 10 Issues regarding
consideration arise when the noncompete agreement is signed shortly
after, but not at or prior to commencement of employment and also
when a noncompete is signed well into an established employment
relationship.
If the noncompete agreement is signed ancillary to the
commencement of employment, the employment itself is sufficient
consideration." Some jurisdictions enforce the ancillary requirement

(E.D. Wis. 2006) ("[C]ovenants not to compete are generally disfavored in the law." (quoting Equity
Enters., Inc. v. Milosch, 633 N.W.2d 662,668 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001))); Intermountain Eye and Laser
Cts., P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 127 P.3d 121, 127 (Idaho 2005) ("Covenants not to compete in employment
contracts are 'disfavored ....");Cranston Print Works Co. v. Pothier, 848 A.2d 213, 219 (R.I.
2004) ("It is well settled that covenants not to compete are disfavored and subject to strict judicial
scrutiny."); Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 678 (Tenn. 2005) ("In
general, covenants not to compete are disfavored in Tennessee."); Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus
Software, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex. App. 2004) ("A covenant not to compete is a disfavored
contract in restraint of trade ....").
7. Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 898; see also Superior Consulting Co. v. Walling, 851 F. Supp.
839, 848 (E.D. Mich. 1994) ("[P]ublic policy disfavoring restraints on trade and interference with a
person's livelihood warrants strict examination of noncompetition covenants."); Vortex Protective
Serv., Inc. v. Dempsey, 463 S.E.2d 67, 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that noncompete agreements
injure the employees by diminishing their ability to make a livelihood and provide for their family);
Herring Gas Co., v. Whiddon, 616 So. 2d 892, 894 (Miss. 1993) ("The law requires a strict
construction of covenants not to compete ....
").
8. See, e.g., Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 207 A.2d 768, 772 (Pa. 1965) (noting
that restrictive covenants ancillary to an employment contract are subject to a more stringent test of
reasonableness than those ancillary to a buy-sell agreement).
9. See, e.g., Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Plunkett, 8 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (E.D. Va. 1998). See
generally J. W. Looney & Anita K. Poole, Adhesion Contracts,Bad Faith, and EconomicallyFaulty
Contracts, 4 DRAKE J.AGRIC. L. 177, 179 (1999) (defining adhesion contracts as "standard form"
contracts offered on a "take it or leave it" basis).
10. E.g., Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Wilson, 953 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(holding that because noncompetes are contractual agreements, "they must be supported by
consideration"); RHIS, Inc. v. Boyce, No. Civ.A. 18924, 2001 WL 1192203, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept.
26, 2001) ("Of course, a covenant to compete must be supported by consideration."); NBZ, Inc. v.
Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93, 95-96 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) ("[R]estrictive covenants in employment
contracts [are] to be supported by consideration ....").
11. Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 466 (Del. Ch. 1977) ("It is generally
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12

strictly and require signing prior to the commencement of employment,
while other jurisdictions will consider an agreement ancillary even if
signed after the employee begins work. 13 In the latter jurisdictions, the
analysis still uses the employee's hiring as the consideration for the
agreement. However, the court finds a factual basis for determining that
the employment had not legally commenced or that the noncompete
agreement was agreed to but not signed before employment
commenced. 14 For example, if an employer and employee have yet to
agree on all important terms of employment, such as pay or commission
structure, the court may not consider employment to have commenced,
even though the employee has begun work. 15 In other instances, if an
employee and employer have agreed on a noncompete agreement
ancillary to employment, consideration will be found even though the
employee does not sign until after commencement.16
If the noncompete agreement is signed after commencement of
employment, jurisdictions are split as to whether additional
consideration is required.' 7 Those holding that no additional

agreed that mutual promises of employer and employee furnish valuable considerations each to the
other for the contract." (quoting James C. Greene Co. v. Kelley, 134 S.E.2d 166, 167 (N.C. 1964))).
12. E.g., Nat'l Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 738, 741 (Minn. 1982)
(illustrating an instance where a noncompete agreement presented and signed three days after
commencement of employment is not supported by consideration because the employee receives no
benefit); C.S.C.S., Inc. v. Carter, 129 S.W.3d 584, 587-90 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (demonstrating an
instance where a noncompete agreement signed four days after the commencement of employment
was not ancillary).
13. E.g., Nat'l Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Wright, 2 F. Supp. 2d 701, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (illustrating
an instance where an agreement signed 10 days after starting work was considered ancillary because
the employee knew of the requirement prior to commencement of employment).
14. Id. at 707-08.
15. Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 648 A.2d 898, 901 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993), aff'd,
648 A.2d 877, 878 (Conn. 1994).
16. Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 446, 448 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (finding a
noncompete agreement signed after commencement of employment to be ancillary, reasoning that
"(i]t is immaterial that the written contract is executed after the employee starts to work. However,
the terms of a verbal covenant which is later reduced to writing must have been agreed upon at the
time of employment in order for the later written covenant to be valid and enforceable.") (citation
omitted).
17. In Lake Land Employment Group of Akron, L.L.C. v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio
2004), the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the current divergent approaches to the issue of whether
consideration is required for a noncompete agreement signed after commencement of employment:
Jurisdictions throughout the country are split on the issue presented by the certified
question. As summarized by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, "cases which have held
that continued employment is not a sufficient consideration stress the fact that an
employee frequently has no bargaining power once he is employed and can easily be
coerced. By signing a noncompetition agreement, the employee gets no more from his

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

5

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 2
228

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:223

consideration is necessary generally focus
on the fact that the employee
18
could have otherwise been terminated.
Jurisdictions which require additional consideration 9 to support a
noncompete agreement signed after the commencement of employment
point to the fact that the employee receives no benefit as a result of
signing the agreement because the employee already has the position,
and the agreement itself provides no benefit.2 0 Those jurisdictions reject
the notion that continued employment alone can support a noncompete
employer than he already has, and in such cases there is a danger that an employer does
not need protection for his investment in the employee but instead seeks to impose
barriers to prevent an employee from securing a better job elsewhere. Decisions in which
continued employment has been deemed a sufficient consideration for a noncompetition
agreement have focused on a variety of factors, including the possibility that the
employee would otherwise have been discharged, the employee was actually employed
for a substantial time after executing the contract, or the employee received additional
compensation or training or was given confidential information after he signed the
agreement.
Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted) (quoting Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies 298 N.W.2d 127,
130 (Minn. 1980)).
18. See Cameo, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 832 (Nev. 1997) ("Today we adopt the majority
rule which states that an at-will employee's continued employment is sufficient consideration for
enforcing a non-competition agreement."). The Camco court reasoned that "[t]here is 'no
substantive difference between the promise of employment upon initial hire and the promise of
continued employment subsequent to 'day one."' Id. (quoting Copeco, Inc. v. Caley, 632 N.E.2d
1299, 1301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)). The Camco court further noted that "[a] contrary holding might
leave the employer in a position of having to fire an at-will employee and then rehire that same
employee with the restrictive covenant in place, or have the covenant held unenforceable for want
of consideration." Id.; see also, e.g., Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978 (D. Ariz
2006) ("[T]he promise of continued employment validates a covenant executed after the
employment relationship has commenced .. "); Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., 229 So. 2d 480, 483
(Ala. 1969); Farm Bureau Serv. Co. of Maynard v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1972);
Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1971); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v.
Foster, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312 (N.H. 1979); M. S. Jacobs & Assocs. v. Duffley, 303 A.2d 921, 923
(Pa. 1973).
19. See generally Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541(Wyo. 1993)
(debating between the choice of finding continued employment as consideration and the
requirement for additional consideration and holding that requiring additional consideration
"recognizes the increasing criticism of the at-will relationship, the usually unequal bargaining power
of the parties, and the reality that the employee rarely 'bargains for' continued employment in
exchange for a potentially onerous restraint on the ability to earn a living").
20. E.g., Nat'l Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (holding that
a noncompete agreement presented and signed three days after commencement of employment was
not supported by consideration because the employee received no benefit); Cox v. Dine-A-Mate,
Inc., 501 S.E.2d 353, 356 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no consideration where the plaintiff did not
receive any change in compensation, commission, duties or other consideration, but rather signed
the agreement to keep his job); Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207, 209 (S.C. 2001)
("[T]here is no consideration when the contract containing the covenant is exacted after several
years employment and the employee's duties and position are left unchanged.").
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agreement, finding any claimed consideration to be "illusory, 21 since the
employer retained the right to terminate the employee at any time.22
These jurisdictions will look for an intangible benefit to support the
agreement, such as "increased wages, a promotion, a bonus, a fixed term
of employment, or perhaps access to protected information.',

23

Still, in

other jurisdictions, courts will look to the specific employment
relationship after the signing of the agreement and allow factors such as
a promotion or lengthy employment history to provide the
consideration.24
The above principles are malleable enough that a court can use
them to find consideration even when strict contract principles would
otherwise lead to an alternative conclusion. One such example is the
Connecticut Supreme Court case of Van Dyck Printing Co. v.
DiNicola Connecticut is a state that requires that the noncompete
agreement be signed ancillary to the commencement of employment;
otherwise additional consideration is needed for a valid agreement. 26 In
Van Dyck, the employee was hired by the employer as a printing

21. E.g., Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999), affd,
548 S.E.2d 207 (S.C. 2001).
22. Id.
23. Labriolav. Pollard Group, Inc., 100 P.3d 791,794 (Wash. 2004) (enbanc).
24. See Lake Land Employment Group of Akron, L.L.C. v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 31
(Ohio 2004).
More recently, some courts have found sufficient consideration in an at-will
employment situation where a substantial period of employment ensues after a
noncompetition covenant is executed, especially when the continued employment is
accompanied by raises, promotion, or similar tangible benefits. These courts thereby
implicitly find that the execution of a noncompetition agreement changes the prior
employment relationship from one purely at will. In effect, these courts infer a promise
on the part of the employer to continue the employment of his previously at-will
employee for an indefinite yet substantial term. Under this approach, however, neither
party knows whether the agreement is enforceable until events occur after its execution.

Id. (citations omitted); see also Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding
consideration existed for a noncompete agreement signed after commencement of employment
because the employee worked for eight years after signing); Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge
Human Res. Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) ("Continued employment for a
substantial period of time is sufficient consideration to support an employment agreement." (citing
McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1313 (I11.App. Ct. 1985))).
25. 648 A.2d 898, 901 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993), affd, 648 A.2d 877, 878 (Conn. 1994).
26. Artman v. Output Techs. Solutions E. Region, Inc., No. CV 00595362S, 2000 WL
992166, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 30, 2000). The Van Dyck court distinguished the facts of its
case from those of a situation where employment had commenced and the employee was asked to
sign a noncompete agreement one year after beginning work; in that situation, there was no
consideration for the contract. Van Dyck, 648 A.2d at 901.
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salesman - a new career for the employee.27 Prior to starting work, the
parties orally agreed that the employee would receive a $150 weekly
draw against commission, a 7% commission for sales up to $100,000,
and a higher, undetermined, rate for total sales above $100,000.28 The
parties agreed that eventually a contract would be written up and would
include a noncompete agreement. 29 Four weeks after the employee
commenced work, he signed an employment agreement which included
a noncompete agreement and provided commissions slightly higher than
7% for sales of between $25,000 and $75,000, and an 8.5% commission
on sales over $75,000.30 The employee worked for the employer for
nearly twenty years, after which he left to begin his3 own company.
Within a week, he was calling on his former customers. 1
The Connecticut Supreme Court found consideration, theorizing
that the open terms in the oral agreement meant that the parties really
had not agreed and, therefore, employment had not commenced. 32 The
court rationalized that the employee's presence at work did not signify
an employment relationship,33 nor that the employer would be
protected.3 4 Additionally, the court reasoned that even if employment
was to be construed as having commenced, "the enhanced commission
rate . . .would
constitute new consideration for the covenant not to
' 35
compete.

27.

Van Dyck, 648 A.2d at 900.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 901.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. The fine line that courts walk in differentiating between consideration and no

consideration is also demonstrated in a pair of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions: Freeman v.
Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983) and Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies,
298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980). In both, employees signed noncompete agreements after the

commencement of employment and neither received money nor other tangible assets at the time of
signing. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 129-30; Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 627-28. In Davies, the employer
argued that consideration existed because the employee was promoted from clerk to salesperson and
received training as a result of signing the noncompete agreement. Davies, 298 N.w.2d at 129. In

Freeman, the employer argued that consideration existed because the employee, a doctor who was
also a shareholder in the clinic, benefited since the clinic was strengthened due to the majority of
physicians signing the agreements. Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 630. The Davies court found
consideration, while the Freeman court did not. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131; Freeman, 334. N.W.2d

at 630. In both cases the court looked at how similarly situated employees fared. In Davies, a
brother of the employee in the family-owned business (owned by their father), refused to sign a
noncompete agreement and remained a clerk. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131. In Freeman, the few

doctors who refused to sign were not punished in any way and all the doctors, whether they signed
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT
Once consideration is found, courts will analyze several
components to determine if the noncompete agreement is to be upheld. 36
First, the court must determine if the employer has a legitimate business
interest that may be protected by a noncompete agreement. If the
employer has a legitimate business interest, the court must then
determine whether the noncompete agreement is reasonable in terms of
time, geography, and prohibited activities.37 While, as noted above,

or not, received the same fringe benefits and were compensated under the same pay scale. Freeman,
334 N.W.2d at 630.
36. Unger v. FFW Corp., 771 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); see also C & L Indus.,
Inc. v. Kiviranta, 698 N.W.2d 240 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005).
The degree of inequality in bargaining power; the risk of the covenantee losing
customers; the extent of respective participation by the parties in securing and retaining
customers; the good faith of the covenantee; the existence of sources or general
knowledge pertaining to the identity of customers; the nature and extent of the business
position held by the covenantor; the covenantor's training, health, education, and needs
of his [or her] family; the current conditions of employment; the necessity of the
covenantor changing his [or her] calling or residence; and the correspondence of the
restraint with the need for protecting the legitimate interests of the covenantee.
Id. at 250 (quoting Am. Sec. Servs. v. Votra, 385 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Neb. 1986)).
37. Unger, 771 N.E.2d at 1244. There are two other factors that are often noted by courts: (1)
whether the agreement is injurious to the public, and (2) a balancing of the harms between the
employer's legitimate interest and the harshness to the employee. Ifa court finds that either of these
factors weighs against enforcement, then the noncompete agreement is void and the analysis in this
article is not applicable. See generally Gillespie v. Carbondale & Marion Eye Ctrs., Ltd., 622
N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) ("In determining the enforceability of covenants not to
compete . . . courts have focused on numerous factors, including whether enforcement of the
contract would be injurious to the public .... "); Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 361
(Minn. 1998) ("In determining whether to enforce a particular noncompete agreement or provision,
the court balances the employer's interest in protection from unfair competition against the
employee's right to earn a livelihood."); Chambers-Dobson, Inc. v. Squier, 472 N.W.2d 391, 400
(Neb. 1991) (noting that the "harshness and oppressiveness on the covenantor employee" is
weighed against "protection of the valid business interest" of the covenantee employer).
As to the public policy considerations, such an analysis is most prominent in cases involving
physicians. See, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1282 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc)
("Although stopping short of banning restrictive covenants between physicians, the American
Medical Association ("AMA") 'discourages' such covenants, finding they are not in the public
interest."); Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ohio 1991) (noting that the disfavor
of noncompete agreements restricting physicians is particularly strong because it greatly affects the
public); see also Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete Between
Physicians: Protecting Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 6 (1992)
("For the past 60 years, the American Medical Association (AMA) has consistently taken the
position that noncompetition agreements between physicians impact negatively on patient care.");
Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Non-Competition Clauses in Professional
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courts disfavor noncompete agreements,38 most courts will uphold a
noncompete agreement if it protects an employer's legitimate business
interest and is reasonable as to temporal and geographic limitations, and
as to the scope of the preclusions.39
These reasonableness determinations are almost always factintensive in nature. 40 The determinations are also the focus of the
remedy analysis in this article. 41 After reviewing the case law analysis
pertaining to the reasonableness factors, this section will take a brief
look at employer-employee state statutes.
A. Legitimate Business Interest
Most decisions analyzing noncompete agreements begin with an
analysis of whether the employer is protecting a legitimate business
interest. 42 The purpose of the noncompete agreement cannot be to avoid
PartnershipAgreements ofAccountants, Physicians,and Attorneys, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 31, 41 (1993).
See generally Arthur S. Di Dio, The Legal Implications of Noncompetition Agreements in Physician
Contracts, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 457, 457-58 (1999) (investigating how restrictive covenants in
physician contracts are analyzed under existing law and the difficulties physician-employees face in
challenging the restrictive covenants); James W. Lowry, Covenants Not to Compete in Physician
Contracts: Recent Trends Defining Reasonableness at Common Law, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 215 passim
(2003) (exploring why courts do and do not uphold physician noncompete agreements).
As with most other occupations, a primary factor the court will look at in determining if a
noncompete is injurious to the public is whether the services that will be precluded are still available
to the public. Redd Pest Control Co. v. Foster, 761 So. 2d 967, 973 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (noting
that a noncompete agreement limiting an employee from providing pest control services was not
injurious to the public, nor did it create a monopoly for the employer, because six or seven other
companies were available in the area).
38. See cases cited supra note 6.
39. See infra Part II.C-D and accompanying text.
40. See Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigation Servs., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 340, 342
(Va. 2005) ("Each non-competition agreement must be evaluated on its own merits, balancing the
provisions of the contract with the circumstances of the businesses and employees involved.").
41. SeeinfraPartIV.
42. Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 90 (Kan. 1996); see also M. Scott McDonald,
Noncompete Contracts: Understandingthe Cost of Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
137 (2003). McDonald notes that among the recognized protectable interests for employers are:
(1) to protect trade secrets and confidential information of the company;
(2) to protect customer goodwill developed for the company (customer relationships);
(3) to protect overall business goodwill and assets that have been sold (noncompetes
used in the sale of a business);
(4) to protect unique and specialized training;
(5) for situations in which the employer has contracted for the services of an individual
of unique value because of who they are (e.g., performers, professional athletes); and
(6) for pinnacle employees in charge of an organization.
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ordinary competition; 43 rather, the agreement must protect a legitimate
business purpose for the employer." Further, an employer does not have
a legitimate interest in protecting against ordinary competition. As one
court put it, in order to prevail, an employer must show that, "without
the covenant, the employee would
gain an unfair advantage in future
45
competition with the employer.,
The ways in which an employer may acquire a legitimate business
interest in restraining an employee through a noncompete agreement can
be roughly grouped into three categories: through an investment in
training, by giving the employee access to trade secrets, and by the
employee creating goodwill with customers. Of these, the final category
is the most common.
1. Training. The court will look to see if the employer has invested
time and money into training the employee and the extent and type of
training the employer provided. If the training consists of routine
training that is widely available or that takes minimal time or expense,
then the employer probably does not have a legitimate business interest
in the training.46 An employer also does not have a legitimate business47
interest in protecting against the use of generally available training.
Additionally, "[i]n determining the legitimacy of the interest the
employer seeks to protect, the court will take into account the
employer's time and monetary investment in the employee's skills and

Id. at 143 (footnotes omitted).
43. Allen, Gibbs & Houlik, L.C. v. Ristow, 94 P.3d 724, 726 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004); see also
Unger v. FFW Corp., 771 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("To show a legitimate
protectible interest, 'an employer must show some reason why it would be unfair to allow the
employee to compete with the former employer."' (quoting Titus v. Rheitone, Inc., 758 N.E.2d 85,
92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001))).
44. Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F. Supp. 2d 973, 979 (D. Ariz. 2006) ("A covenant not to
compete is generally enforceable as long as it is no broader than necessary to protect an employer's
legitimate business interests."); Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Hobley, 130 P.3d 1215,
1222 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) ("[O]nly legitimate business interests may be protected by a noncompete
agreement ... ").
45. Vantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
46. Id. at 644-45; See 7's Enters., Inc., v. Del Rosario, 143 P.3d 23, 31 (Haw. 2006) (noting
that "[s]pecialized or unique training, as distinguished from general skills" is a protectable business
interest).
47. See Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Foppiano, 382 S.E.2d 499, 501-02 (W. Va. 1989) ("When
the skills and information acquired by a former employee are of a general managerial nature, such
as supervisory, merchandising, purchasing and advertising skills and information, a restrictive
covenant in an employment contract will not be enforced because such skills and information are
not protectible employer interests." (quoting Helms Boys, Inc. v. Brady, 297 S.E.2d 840, 841 (W.
Va. 1982))).
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development of his craft., 48 Further, an employer only has a protectable
interest in restraining an employee's unique knowledge and skills that
were obtained through training with the employer. 49 Thus, if the
employer spends several weeks or months training an employee on the
employer's own technical products, it probably has a legitimate business
interest to protect.5
An example of the type of unique training which will create a
legitimate business interest can be found in Aero Kool Corp. v.
Oosthuizen.51 In Aero, the employee had no prior experience in aviation
52
repair when he was hired by the employer, an aviation repair company.
The employer provided him with 195 hours of training, which allowed
him to become certified by the FAA. 53 After failing a drug test, the
employee was fired and then hired shortly thereafter by the employer's
competitor.54 The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of the
employer's request for a temporary injunction, noting that the employee
had no prior
experience and received certification by the FAA due to the
55
training.
2. Trade secrets / confidential information. Noncompete
agreement analysis occasionally crosses over with analysis of a

48. Brunswick Floors, Inc. v. Guest, 506 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (Ga. 1982)); see also Orkin Exterminating
Co. v. Bumett, 146 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Iowa 1967) (enforcing a noncompete agreement where the
employee had been given eight weeks training in exterminating insects and methods of operation);
Dain Bosworth, Inc. v. Brandhorst, 356 N.W.2d 590, 593-94 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a
$20,000 training investment created a legitimate business interest).
49. Vantage Tech. L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.w.3d 637, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("[Whether an
employer has a protectable interest in its investment in training an employee depends on whether the
skill acquired as a result of that training is sufficiently special as to make a competing use of it by
the employee unfair."); see also Brentlinger Enters. v. Curran, 752 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001) (noting one factor to consider in determining reasonableness of a noncompete is whether the
agreement will stifle pre-existing skills).
50. Compare 7's Enters, Inc., v. Del Rosario, 143 P.3d 23, 32 (Haw. 2006) (holding that a
legitimate business interest existed where the sales training included "something secret," was
specifically designed and solely developed by employer over a number of years, and was not being
utilized by other companies) with Moore Bus. Forms, 382 S.E.2d at 501-02 (finding no legitimate
business interest when training was not unique or specialized to the company and the information
disseminated was readily available to competitors).
51. 736 So. 2d25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
52. Id. at 25.
53. Id. at 25-26.
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id. at 26-27. The Aero court distinguished the case from Austin v. Mid State Fire
Equipment of Central Florida, 727 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), where an employee
already had extensive industry experience prior to being hired and had not received any specialized
knowledge from the employer. See id. at 1098.
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confidentiality agreement protecting trade secrets. This term is
oftentimes used loosely by courts in noncompete agreement analysis to
refer to items such as customer lists and methods of operation which
may or may not be considered "trade secrets" under laws regulating
trade secrets.56 Of course, if the employee is under a confidentiality
agreement, the employee cannot disclose the trade secrets, regardless
whether a noncompete agreement is in place.57
An example of "trade secret" analysis in the context of a
noncompete agreement can be found in Bed Mart, Inc. v. Kelley,58 in
which the employee had access to the company's "Product Bible,"
which contained information about all the merchandise in the stores and
the wholesale prices of those items, as well as promotional deals from
suppliers.59 In reversing the trial court's decision that a six month
restriction was unreasonable, the court reasoned in part that the "Product
Bible" was updated every six months, so the employee would have a
competitive advantage were he to go work for a competitor while the
book was still valid.6 °
3. Customer Contacts. The most common way a legitimate
business interest is created is through the employee's contact with
customers. This line of analysis, also referred to as protecting the
employer's "goodwill," focuses on the relationship between the
employee and the employer's customers. As one court stated: "'good
will' is broader than simply the names, addresses and requirements of
customers, or some pricing information, it also includes the
advantageous familiarity and personal contact that employees ... derive
from their dealings with the employer's customers., 61 To determine if an
employee's customer contacts are sufficient to create a legitimate
business interest for the employer, courts look to see if the employee has
become the face of the company in the minds of the employer's
customers.62 Perhaps the most common example is the outside

56. See generally Markovits v. Venture Info Capital, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 647, 657 n.6

(S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("A trade secret is any formula or combination of information that is used in
business and gives its owner a competitive advantage over others in the marketplace who do not
have access to it.").
57. See generally Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements

Enforceable?,25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 627 (1999) (discussing confidentiality agreements in the
context of tobacco litigation).
58. 45 P.3d 1219 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).

59. Id. at 1222.
60. Id. at 1223.
61. Standard Register Co. v. Cleaver, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
62. Vantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
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salesperson who visits customers at their work places.63 In this situation,
the employee is likely to be the only real contact between the employer
and the customer. 64
In determining if an employer has a legitimate business interest to
protect under this category, courts will look at the nature and extent of
the contact between the employee and the customer, and also the type of
product being delivered.65 Particularly in a situation where the
employer's products are similar to others in the marketplace, "[t]he
possibility is present that the customer will regard ... the attributes of
the employee as more important in his business dealings than any special
qualities of the product or service of the employer ....
Once it is determined that the employer has a legitimate interest to
protect, the next issues are the reasonableness of the limitations on the
employee as to the potential customers the employee may contact and
the types of positions the employee may accept during the tolling of the
noncompete agreement. The court also must determine whether the
temporal and geographic limitations in the noncompete agreement are
reasonable.
B. Reasonableness of Limitations on Customer Contact and Employment
Positions
Of course, simply because an employer has a legitimate business
interest to protect does not mean the employer may broadly preclude the
employee from any type of competition. The agreement must be
narrowly tailored to preclude only those positions and customer contacts
necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interests. 67

63. See, e.g., Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 2002);
StandardRegister, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1096; Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Somers, 37 F. Supp. 2d 673,
675 (D.N.J. 1999).
64. See, e.g., N. Am. Prods. Corp. v. Moore, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228 (M.D. Fla. 2002)

("[A]n employer has a legitimate business interest in prohibiting solicitation of its customers with
whom the employee [sales representative] has a substantial relationship."); Am. Fid. Assurance
Corp. v. Leonard, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (D. Kan. 2000) (upholding an agreement where the

employee representative was the sole contact with the customer).
65.

Standard Register Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1095-96. The court also noted that "in industries

where personal contact between the employee and customer are especially important due to
similarity in the product offered by competitors, the advantage acquired through the employee's
representative contact with customers is part of the employer's good will, irrespective of whether or
not the employee had access to confidential information." Id. (quoting Field v. Alexander &
Alexander ofind. Inc., 503 N.E.2d 627, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)).
66. Am. Sec. Servs. Inc. v. Vodra, 385 N.W.2d 73, 78 (Neb. 1986).
67. Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Res. Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 442 (Ill.
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Agreements may be found to be overly broad when the employer
seeks to preclude the employee from any position that competes with the
employer, especially if dissimilar to the employee's duties with the
employer. For example, a noncompete agreement precluding a dentist
from competing with his former employer in both oral surgery and
general dentistry was unreasonably broad as to the portion that limited
practice of general dentistry because the dentist only practiced oral
surgery with the employer.68 Similarly, a noncompete agreement
precluding a truck parts salesperson from working "in any capacity...
whatsoever ... in any business activities ... competitive with those of
[the employer]" was overly broad as the employer's interests exceeded
the area in which the employee sold.69
Since employers are generally most concerned with protecting
customer relationships, a common issue in noncompete agreement
litigation is whether the agreement reasonably defines which customers
the employee may not solicit. Generally, the employer must be careful to
narrowly limit customer preclusion.70
Noncompete agreements precluding the employee from contacting
any of the employer's customers are usually found unreasonable; the
preclusion must generally be limited to only the customers who dealt
with the employee. 71 Also, it is generally unreasonable to preclude the
App. Ct. 1997); see also Concord Orthopaedics Prof 1.Ass'n. v. Forbes, 702 A.2d 1273, 1276 (N.H.
1997) (adopting the principle that a noncompete agreement must be narrowly tailored "to
encompass only legitimate interests of the employer").
68. See Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754 (N.Y. 1971). This is an example of a
noncompete agreement term which is "severable." See infra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
69. McNeilus Cos. v. Sams, 971 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997); see also Ken's
Stereo-Video Junction, Inc. v. Plotner, 560 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a
noncompete agreement overly broad when it precluded a car stereo and security system installer
from working for a competitor in any capacity, even as a janitor); Harville v. Gunter, 495 S.E.2d
862, 864 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (finding it unreasonable to prohibit a speech pathologist from being an
officer or director of a company engaged in speech pathology, reasoning that an officer or director is
markedly different from a speech pathologist); Pathfinder Commc'ns Corp. v. Macy, 795 N.E.2d
1103, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a term in a radio disc jockey's noncompete agreement
that he "will not engage in activities," at a competing station as unreasonably broad because it
extended far beyond the employer's interests of the employee as a disc jockey); Motion Control
Sys., Inc. v. East, 546 S.E.2d 424, 426 (Va. 2001) (finding a noncompete agreement overly broad
when the employer defined a "similar business" as "any business that designs, manufactures, sells or
distributes motors, motor drives or motor controls," which the court found "could include a wide
range of enterprises unrelated to" the employer's business).
70. See, e.g., Prod. Action Int'l, Inc. v. Mero, 277 F. Supp. 2d 919, 926 (S.D. Ind. 2003)
(finding a noncompete provision unreasonable where it "fails to impose any reasonable limit in
terms of... customers").
71. See DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Casillo, 435 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding
overbroad a term precluding a former employee from soliciting any customer "having business
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employee from contacting former clients of the employer. However, it
may be reasonable to preclude the employee from contacting current73
customers, if those customers pre-existed the employment relationship.
Finally, precluding an employee from contacting the
employer's
74
potential customers will most often be held unreasonable.
C. Reasonableness of the Temporal Limitation
All noncompete agreements have, or should have, a specific time
after which the agreement expires.7 5 Again, the court will carefully
scrutinize this term to ensure that it is reasonable, using a fact intensive
inquiry based on the employee and the industry.
In analyzing whether a certain temporal limitation is reasonable,
courts generally look at two alternative standards: (1) the time necessary
to hire and train a replacement; and (2) the time necessary to obliterate
the connection between the customer and the departing employee in the
76
mindsInofshort,
the employer's
customers.
the employer
should be made whole before the departing

dealings" with the employer); Advance Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Roadtrac, L.L.C., 551 S.E.2d 735,
738 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (finding a noncompete agreement to be overly broad where it precluded the
employee from contacting any of the employer's customers, even those with whom the employee
never worked); Prof'l. Bus. Servs. Co. v. Rosno, 680 N.W.2d 176, 186-87 (Neb. 2004) (finding it
unreasonable to prohibit a former employee from soliciting customers of the employer with whom
the employee did not have substantial or any personal contact).
72. See Rosno, 680 N.W.2d at 186-87 (holding it unreasonable to prohibit a former employee
from soliciting former customers of the employer); Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d
900, 904 (Neb. 1982) (noting that a former employer "certainly can have [no interest] in its former
clients"); Equity Enters., Inc. v. Milosch, 633 N.W.2d 662, 670 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
unreasonable a noncompete term prohibiting a former employee from contacting any customers of
the employer whom the employee serviced at "any time" during his employment, which would have
prohibited the employee from doing business with a customer he serviced during the first weeks of
his 15-year employment).
73. Prairie Eye Ctr.,
Ltd. v.Butler, 713 N.E.2d 610, 610-11 (111.
App. Ct. 1999).
74. Freiburger v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., I ll P.3d 100, 107 (Idaho 2005) (finding a noncompete
agreement overly broad, in part, because it precluded a former employee from soliciting "pending"
customers).
75. Diversified Fastening Sys., Inc. v. Rogge, 786 F. Supp. 1486, 1492 (N.D. Iowa 1991)
("The failure to limit the time period and geographical restriction essentially make the contract one
imposing a restrictive covenant of unlimited time and space. Such an unlimited covenant is clearly
unreasonable and unenforceable."). But see C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Enforceability of
Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employment Contract, as Affected by Duration of Restriction, 41
A.L.R.2d 15, 41-42 (1955) (listing cases purporting to support the notion that the lack of a time
limitation does not render the noncompete agreement ipso facto unenforceable).
76. Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1980).
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employee is allowed to help a competitor. 77 Most often, both of the
above factors are considered when determining the reasonableness of the
time restriction because most contested noncompete agreements involve
employees with customer contacts. Noncompetes may, however, be
upheld against employees without customer contacts. Most courts will
look for an employee whose services are "'special, unique or
extraordinary' and not merely of 'high value to his employer. ,,78 Also, it
generally must be shown that the employee's services are "of such
character as to make his replacement impossible or that the loss of such
services would cause the employer irreparable injury.,

79

In Parma

80

International,Inc. v. Bartos, the employee provided the company with
special designs and improvements in the manufacturing of model cars. 8'
In upholding a one year restriction, the court noted that the employee
was also instrumental in taking the company from a cottage industry to
five million dollar per year in revenues over the employee's six years.82
However, the more common point of analysis, especially with
regard to positions that would reasonably require a noncompete
agreement, is that of the amount of time necessary for the new employee
to reasonably replace the departing employee in the minds of the
customers. This is a fact-intensive analysis, as demonstrated in Standard
83
Register Co. v. Cleaver.
In Standard, the employee sold business forms and specialty
printing items, and prior to commencing employment, he signed a
noncompete agreement precluding him from selling to the employer's
customers for two years after the employment relationship ended. 84 The
employee developed close relationships with his customers and visited
major customers every two weeks, regardless of their ordering
schedule. 85 The employee was generally the sole contact with the

77. See Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1284 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) ("An
employer may also have a legitimate interest in having a "reasonable amount of time to overcome
the former employee's loss, usually by hiring a replacement and giving that replacement time to
establish a working relationship." (citing Blake, supra note 2, at 659)).
78. Brentlinger Enters. v. Curran, 752 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (citing Parma
Int'l., Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89CA004573, 1990 WL 11716, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1990)).
79. Brentlinger,752 N.E.2d at 1002 (quoting Purchasing Assocs. v. Weitz, 196 N.E. 2d 245,
249 (1963)).
80. 1990 WL 11716 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7,1990).
81. Id. at *3.
82. Id. at *2.
83. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
84. Id. at 1089.
85. Id. at 1090.
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customers.8 6 Soon after the employment relationship ended, the
employee began selling for a competitor in his former territory. 87
The court framed the temporal limitation legal issue as: "After what
period of time will the customer cease to be influenced by the personal
relationship the employee was able to establish while in the employ of
his employer?" 88 The court noted that in making this determination, it
looked at the regularity and frequency of the contacts between the
employee and the customer. 89 If the employee has frequent contacts with
the customer, a shorter duration will be necessary to replace the
employee, assuming the new employee commences with a similar
visitation schedule. 90
Since the employee in Standard made very frequent visits to his
customers, at first blush it would seem that two years would be an
unreasonable restraint. 91 However, the court upheld the two year
restriction, relying on two points of analysis. 92 First, the visits
themselves could be characterized as progressive, as the employee
learned more and more on each visit about how the customer's business
was organized and who the key personnel were. 93 He even attended
socializing events, and built personal relationships with the customers'
decision-makers. 94 Secondly, major customers oftentimes used a "test
order" process in which the employee had to get to know the customer's
business and the customer determined if it to would take the product, a
process which usually took several months. 95 Thus, even though the
employee's contact with the customer was frequent and regular, two
years was a reasonable restriction because the new employee would have
to make several visits to acquire the knowledge and understanding of the
customer's business to truly replace the departing employee, especially
in an industry where the difference between competing projects was
"razor thin" and the knowledge of and relationship with the customer

86. Id.
87. Id.at 1091.
88. Id. at 1098 (citing C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant
Ancillary to Employment Contract, as Affected by Duration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 34

(1955)).
89. Id. (citing C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant Ancillary to
Employment Contract,as Affected by Durationof Restriction, 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 34 (1955)).
90. See id.
91. Seeid.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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96

D. Reasonablenessof the GeographicLimitation
A noncompete agreement also usually includes a limitation on
where the employee may seek employment. 97 As with the temporal
limitation analysis, the determination of whether a geographic limitation
is reasonable is fact intensive. 98 The general rule isthat the "contractual
prohibitions must be geographically limited to what is reasonably
necessary to protect the employer's business." 99 The geographic
limitation is written either as an actual geographic "line"' 100 or in terms
of customers. lO

A traditional geographic limitation simply precludes the employee
from working in a particular county or state or mile radius. 102 In
determining reasonableness, there is, however, a focus on customers.103
For example in Herring Gas Co., Inc. v. Magee,104 a propane salesman
was precluded from working within fifty miles of both existing and

96. Id. at 1096.
97. See generally C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant,
Ancillary to Employment Contract, as Affected by Duration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 134
(1955) ("[T]he territorial extent of the restraint plays an important role in the consideration of the
reasonableness of the restraint.").
98. Wausau Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Magda, 366 F. Supp. 2d 212, 220 (D. Me. 2005) ("[T]he
reasonableness of a noncompetition covenant ...must be determined by the facts developed in each
").
case as to its... geographic area ....
99. Wolfv. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 420 S.E.2d 217, 222 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992).
100. See, e.g., King v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., 886 So. 2d 769, 770 (Ala. 2004)
(two mile radius); Deming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 623, 637 (Conn. 2006) (twentyfive mile radius); Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So. 2d 43, 53-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Emergency Assoc. of Tampa, P.A. v. Sassano, 664 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(five square miles); Maine Eye Care Assocs. P.A. v. Gorman, 890 A.2d 707, 709 (Me. 2006) (thirty
mile radius).
101. Wolf 420 S.E.2d at 222 ("Prohibitions against contacting existing customers can be a
valid substitute for a geographic limitation.").
102. Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 834 (Nev.1997) (holding a noncompete agreement
too broad where it prohibited former management employees from competing within fifty miles of
any location in which the employer targeted expansion, noting that "[t]o be reasonable, the
territorial restriction should be limited to the territory in which appellants [former employers]
established customer contacts and good will." (quoting Snelling & Snelling, Inc. v. Dupay Enters.,
609 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980))); see also Weatherford Oil & Tool Co. v. Campbell,
327 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (holding geographical restriction "in any area where
[employer] may be operating or carrying on business" void as unlimited regarding territory).
103. See Stringer v. Herron, 424 S.E.2d 547, 548 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding a fifteen mile
radius restriction unreasonable when an "overwhelming majority" of employer's clients lived much
closer than fifteen miles from the business).
104. 813 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
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future locations.10 5 In limiting the noncompete agreement to only those
locations in existence at the time the employment relationship ended, the
court noted that "[t]he primary right of the employer is that of protecting
the business from loss of customers by the activities of the former
employees who have peculiar knowledge of and relationships with the
employer's customers., 10 6 The court reasoned that such knowledge
could not be acquired outside of the areas surrounding the existing
employer's locations. 10 7 A geographic limitation based on a specific
county or state line or mile radius is the easiest to analyze and is more
likely to be seen as reasonable when the business is one in which the
customers seek out the business. 08
On the other hand, some employment situations, particularly those
in which the employee seeks out and/or visits the customer, do not lend
themselves to a clear-cut traditional geographic limitation. In many such
situations, the so-called geographic limitation is written in terms of
customers.10 9 For example, the noncompete may be drafted to preclude
the employee not from a specific mile radius or other geographic
boundary, but in terms of not contacting former customers. 10 In Wolfv.
Colonial Life and Accident Insurance Co.,'11 the noncompete precluded
the former employee insurance agent from contacting existing policy
holders and accounts. 1"2 The employee argued that this effectively
11 3
precluded him from contact with customers throughout the country.
The court reasoned that this was appropriate, as the employer did

105. Id. at 1245.
106. Id. (quoting
107. Id.
108.

Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 157 So. 2d 133, 136 (Miss. 1963)).

See Unger v. FFW Corp., 771 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a bank

employee's noncompete agreement reasonable when it extended to the county where the bank was
located and to the immediately surrounding counties, as it was not unusual for a bank to have
customers from an adjacent county). But see Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of Ham Lake, Inc., 372
N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a noncompete agreement unenforceable when the

bank employee had no special relationships with the bank's customers).
109. See Robert S. Weiss & Assocs., Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 220 (Conn. 1988)
(finding the lack of a specific geographic limitation acceptable when the noncompete agreement

precluded employee from soliciting employer's existing accounts for two years); Norlund v. Faust,
675 NE.2d 1142, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App.1997) ("The use of territorial boundaries is only one method

of limiting a covenant's scope, and when a covenant not to compete contains a restraint which
clearly defines a class of persons with whom contact is prohibited, the need for a geographical
restraint is decreased.").
110.
2004).
111.
112.
113.

See Crown It Servs., Inc. v. Koval-Olsen, 782 N.Y.S.2d 708, 710-11 (N.Y. App. Div.
420 S.E.2d 217 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 222.

Id.
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business nationwide and therefore needed such broad protection. 114
As with the temporal limitation, the reasonableness of a customerlist "geographic" limitation is very fact intensive and raises interesting
questions as to the limits of such a restriction. 115Should the employee be
precluded from contacting former customers who were no longer active
at the time employment was terminated? How about potential customers
the employee was actively soliciting but had not yet successfully sold at
the time of termination?" 16 As to the latter, if the employee is marketing
a line of generally available products, then the employee probably
cannot be reasonably precluded from entities that were not customers at
the time of termination. On the other hand, if the employee sells, for
example, consulting and information technology solutions to hospitals
and medical clinics that carry a high price tag and take several months or
even years between initial contact and implementation of the products
and services, then the employer may reasonably preclude the former
employee from contacting the potential customer.
E. Statutory Schemes
Several jurisdictions have passed statutes pertaining to noncompete
agreements." 7 Generally, these statutes do not provide any specific
guidelines; rather, they simply codify the basic common law rules
requiring reasonable business interests and reasonable geographic and
temporal limitations. 1 8 This is certainly not surprising, as the variety of
employment situations make drafting specific limitations impossible.
The few statutes that do attempt to provide more precise guidance are
still too vague or incomplete to provide boiler plate application. For
example, the Oklahoma statute proscribes noncompete agreements from
114. Id.
115. Herring Gas Co. v. Magee, 813 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (S.D. Miss. 1993) ("Reasonableness
as to time and space limitations must be determined from the facts of each case." (quoting Tex. Rd.
Boring Co. of La.-Miss. v. Parker, 194 So. 2d 885, 889 (Miss. 1967))).
116. See UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1080,
1085 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) review denied 766 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio 2002) (holding a noncompete
agreement precluding employee from contacting potential customers as valid because the employer
has a legitimate interest in limiting the former employee from taking advantage of contacts made,
customer lists, skills acquired, confidential information and personal relationships developed during
the course of the former employee's employment with the aggrieved employer); Markovits v.
Venture Info Capital, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 647, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (upholding a restrictive
covenant precluding employee from contacting even potential customers).
117.

E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2005); Wis.

STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2002).
118. E.g., § 445.774a(1); § 653.295(1), (6)(c); § 103.465.
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prohibiting employees from working in the same industry or field, but
does allow the agreements to preclude employees from soliciting
"established" customers.1 19 The statute does not, however, define the
term "established," nor does it provide any guidance as to what a court
may consider reasonable temporal or geographical limitations. The few
1 20
and temporal 121
statutes that do attempt to address geographic
limitations only provide broad guidelines.
The only specific language that can be found in a survey of state
statutes pertains to limitations on who may be restricted. Some statutes
specifically preclude noncompete agreements for certain occupations,
such as physician' or broadcast industry employees. 123 At least one
state limits noncompete agreements to only "[e]xecutive and
management personnel and officers and employees who
constitute
' 24
professional staff to executive and management personnel."'
The statutorily mandated terms approach is too rigid. Employment
relationships, and the products and services sold and provided, are too
varied for fixed terms to operate equitably. These terms are as likely to
be inequitable for employees as they are for employers. A one-year
limitation would be unreasonable on a salesperson for a distributor of
routine office products; that same one-year limitation would be unfair to

119.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 219A(A) (West Supp. 2007).

A person who makes an agreement with an employer, whether in writing or
verbally, not to compete with the employer after the employment relationship has been
terminated, shall be permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by the
former employer or in a similar business as that conducted by the former employer as
long as the former employee does not directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a
combination of goods and services from the established customers of the former
employer.
See generally Jeb Boatman, Contract Law: As Clear as Mud: The Demise of the Covenant Not To
Compete in Oklahoma, 55 OKLA. L. REv. 491 (2002) (discussing Oklahoma's laws governing noncompete employment contracts, and the ways in which the recent amendments to these laws
facilitated employer-employee contractual relations versus the ways in which they restrain the
parties
from reaching desirable contractual agreements).
120. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2006) (allowing noncompete agreements that specify an
employee may not compete within "within a specified county, first or second class municipality, or
other specified area").
121. Id. (allowing a noncompete to extend "for any period not exceeding two years from the
date of termination of the agreement"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (West 2003)
(allowing a noncompete agreement to stand as long as an employee has "served an employer for a
period of less than two years").
122. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3) (West 2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2707 (2006).
123. 820 ILL. COMP.STAT. ANN. § 17/10(a) (West Supp. 2002).
124. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(d) (West 2003).
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an employer who provides custom products or services that require longterm planning and servicing between initial contact and the finalization
of the sale.
IV. JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY APPROACHES TO UNREASONABLE
TERMS

While the points of analysis jurisdictions use to determine if the
noncompete agreement contains an unreasonable term are fairly
consistent, the remedies jurisdictions use vary. 12 5 There are three basic
approaches jurisdictions use in response to an unreasonable term:
voiding the agreement, using the "Blue Pencil" doctrine to eliminate an
unreasonable term, and using the "Blue Pencil" doctrine26
to eliminate an
term.

unreasonable term and replace it with a reasonable
A. Agreement Void

In several jurisdictions a noncompete agreement is voided if one

125. See generally Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Enforceability, Insofar as Restrictions
Would be Reasonable, of Contract Containing Unreasonable Restrictions on Competition, 61
A.L.R.3d 397 (1975) (explaining varying remedies for unreasonable terms in noncompete
agreements, including: the view that unreasonable restrictions may be modified and enforced
generally; the Restatement's view; the view requiring strict divisibility; the view not requiring strict
divisibility; the view requiring divisibility dependent on the nature of the contract).
126. Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I. 1989) (discussing the three
approaches, arguing that jurisdictions are moving away from voiding agreements and towards using
one of the "Blue Pencil" approaches); GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 80.15,
at 138-41 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003):
[Some] courts interpret or reform the restrictive promise, if possible, so as to make the
extent and character of its operation reasonable. Some courts will refuse to enforce any
part of the covenant if the covenant was not drafted in the good faith belief that it was
valid. Some courts will refuse to enforce any part unless the whole is reasonable. These
courts may refuse to partially enforce even when the contract specifically says that it
should
be
partially
enforced.
The approach of enforcing the restriction to the extent it is reasonable is the
approach preferred by many modem courts and is in fact a superior approach. To refuse
to enforce a covenant entirely, even for a minor deviation from the reasonableness
standard, is too harsh a result, given the lack of precision of the reasonableness analysis
and the recognized benefit of reasonably restrictive covenants . . . . Courts that have
refused to reform covenants not drafted in the good faith belief that the restraint was
valid appropriately safeguarded the legitimate interests of the employee.

Id. (footnote omitted).
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term is found to be unreasonable.1 27 In at least one instance this result is
statutorily mandated.12 8 The reasoning behind the "all-or-nothing"' 129 rule

is consistent with a fundamental philosophy underlying the analysis of
noncompete agreements: to limit the agreements to the minimum
restriction necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business
interest. 30 The employer, the reasoning goes, will take great precautions
to ensure that it does not include overreaching terms for fear that the
entire agreement will be voided. 131
In addition, many decisions adhering to the all-or-nothing rule cite
an in terrorem effect of noncompete agreements, 132 as enunciated by
Professor Harlan Blake:
Courts and writers have engaged in hot debate over whether
severance should ever be applied to an employee restraint. The
argument against doing so is persuasive. For every covenant that finds

its way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in terrorem
effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations and on
competitors who fear legal complications if they employ a covenantor,

127. E.g., Quality Liquid Feeds, Inc. v. Plunkett, 199 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004)
("The contract must be valid as written; the court will not apportion or enforce a contract to the
extent that it might be considered reasonable." (citing Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994
S.W.2d468,473 (Ark. 1999))).
128. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2002) ("Any covenant, described in this subsection,
imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of the
covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint.").
129. This phrase was used in Durapin,Inc., 559 A.2d at 1058 (citing Cent. Adjust. Bureau, Inc.
v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 36 (Tenn. 1984)).
130. See Vlasin v. Len Johnson & Co., 455 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Neb. 1990) (holding that to be
upheld, the "restriction [must be] reasonable in the sense that it is no greater than is reasonably
necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest ....
");Mkt. Am., Inc. v. ChristmanOrth, 520 S.E.2d 570, 578 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a "restraint is unreasonable and void
if it is greater than is required for the protection of the promise... " (quoting Starkings Court
Reporting Servs., Inc. v. Collins, 313 S.E.2d 614, 615 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984))); Volt Servs. Group,
Div. of Volt Mgmt. Corp. v. Adecco Employment Servs., 35 P.3d 329, 334 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)
("The reasonableness of a noncompetition covenant must be determined in view of what is
reasonably necessary to safeguard the employer's protectible interest." (citing Mail-Well Envelope
Co. v. Saley, 497 P.2d 364 (1972))).
131. Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217, 227 (Wis. 1998) (noting that the
Wisconsin statute requires that a noncompete agreement containing an unreasonable term be
declared void and that "[tihis burden was specifically imposed so that 'employers possessing
bargaining power superior to that of the employees' would not be encouraged 'to insist upon
unreasonable and excessive restrictions, secure in the knowledge that the promise will be upheld in
part, if not in full."' (quoting Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 348 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Wis.
1984))).
132. E.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999); White v.
Fletcher/Mayo/Assocs., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 746, 748 (Ga. 1983).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol24/iss2/2

24

Swift: Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils: Judicial an
2007]

Judicialand Legislative Handlingof Noncompete Agreements

247

or who are anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with their
competitors. Thus, the mobility of untold numbers of employees is

restricted by the intimidation of restrictions whose severity no court
would sanction. If severance is generally applied, employers can
fashion truly ominous covenants with confidence that they will be

pared down and enforced when the facts of a particular case are not
unreasonable.13 3 This smacks of having one's employee's cake, and
eating it too.
Jurisdictions using the all-or-nothing theory also quote Blake's

reasoning that noncompete agreements are quite often akin to contracts
of adhesion as the employee oftentimes does not have legitimate

bargaining power. 134
At least one court noted that more recent decisions have rejected
135
the all-or-nothing rule in favor of some form of judicial modification.
In the last twenty years, many courts have utilized one of two forms of
the "Blue Pencil" doctrine. 136 In one form, the doctrine is used to remove
an unreasonable term from the noncompete agreement, leaving the
remaining terms to be applied. In the other form, the doctrine is used to

rewrite the unreasonable term to make it reasonable.
B. The "Blue Pencil" Doctrine Used to Knock-Out Unreasonable
Terms

One approach, taken by numerous jurisdictions, is to remove
unreasonable terms and enforce the agreement as to the remaining,
reasonable provisions. 137 Within these jurisdictions, there exists a

133. Blake, supra note 2, at 682-83 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 683-94; see White, 303 S.E.2d at 748, n.2 (citing Blake, supra note 2, at 682-83).
135. Durapin,559A.2dat1058.
136. Id. This author is unaware of the origin of the term "Blue Pencil," although it is believed
to be the color pencil used by editors in the past.
137. See Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983) ("[l]fthe covenant
is clearly separated into parts and some parts are reasonable and others are not, the contract may be
held divisible."); MiCH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a(1) (2002).
An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant which
protects an employer's reasonable competitive business interests and expressly prohibits
an employee from engaging in employment or a line of business after termination of
employment if the agreement or covenant is reasonable as to its duration, geographical
area, and the type of employment or line of business. To the extent any such agreement
or covenant is found to be unreasonablein any respect, a court may limit the agreement
to render it reasonable in light of the circumstances in which it was made and
specifically enforce the agreementas limited.
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difference as to when the doctrine may be used. While some courts will
review an agreement more generally to see if certain prohibitions may be
removed, 138 many require that the unreasonable term or terms be clearly
severable from the reasonable terms. 139 The noncompete agreement in
such jurisdictions must be grammatically meaningful after striking out
any unreasonable restrictions. 140
The issue in many cases is whether the unreasonable terms are truly
severable from the reasonable terms. One aspect courts will look for is
whether there is an agreement as to severability in the form of a
severability clause.1 4 Additionally, and more importantly, courts will
look for mechanical severability; one court noted that a covenant is
severable only where it "is in effect a combination of several distinct
covenants.' 42 For example, a 'noncompete term which precludes the
employee from soliciting customers of both the employer (parent
company) as well as "affiliated companies" is considered two separate
agreements which can be severed to remove the (presumably
unreasonable) term "affiliated companies."' 43 On the other hand, terms
such as "100 miles" or "State of South Carolina" are not considered

Id. (emphasis added).
138. Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1058 (holding that the best remedy is to allow "unreasonable
restraints to be modified and enforced, whether or not their terms are divisible.").
139. See, e.g., Prod. Action Int'l., Inc. v. Mero, 277 F. Supp. 2d 919, 926 (S.D. Ind. 2003)
("[I]f a covenant is clearly separated into parts, and if some parts are reasonable and others are not,
the contract may be severed, or "blue penciled," so that the reasonable portions may be enforced."
(citing Licocci, 445 N.E.2d at 561)).
140. Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1058 (citing Wood v. May, 438 P.2d 587, 591 (Wash. 1968) (en
bane)).
141. See, e.g., Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681, 688-89 (D.S.C. 2003);
Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596, 604 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (containing the following
severability clause: "If any court of competent jurisdiction rules that any portion of this Agreement
is invalid for any reasons, the remainder of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and
shall not be affected thereby").
142. Rockford Mfg., 296 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (quoting Somerset v. Reyner, 104 S.E.2d 344, 348
(S.C. 1958)). The Somerset court noted that:
A restrictive covenant which contains or may be read as containing distinct undertakings
bounded by different limits of space or time, or different in subject matter, may be good
as to part and bad as to part. But this does not mean that a single covenant may be
artificially split up in order to pick out some part of it that it can be upheld. Severance is
permissible only in the case of a covenant which is in effect a combination of several
distinct covenants.
Somerset, 104 S.E.2d at 347-48 (citing Beit v. Beit, 63 A.2d 161, 166 (Conn. 1949).
143. RockfordMfg., 296 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
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severable. 144
This severability analysis means that when the three above
delineated categories of reasonableness 145 - restrictions on customers
and positions, time, and geography - are analyzed, two of them, time
and geography, are rarely going to be subjected to severance because
"severing overly broad time and territory provisions would eliminate
46
clauses inherently necessary to a covenant not to compete." 1
Other jurisdictions have rejected a formal severability analysis in
favor of a more flexible approach. 147 "Courts adopting this approach
ignore the divisibility aspect and exercise their inherent equity powers to
modify and enforce 48
covenants whether their phraseology lends itself to
not.'
or
severability
C. The "Blue Pencil" Doctrine Used to Rewrite UnreasonableTerms
Courts which reject a strict severability analysis may also utilize the
Blue Pencil doctrine not only to remove an unreasonable term, but also
to rewrite the term to make it reasonable. 149 Under this approach, courts
144. Id. at 688.
145. See discussion supra Part III.B-D.
146. Profl Liab. Consultants, Inc. v. Todd, 468 S.E.2d 578, 583 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (Smith,
J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam, Prof'l Liab. Consultants, Inc., v. Todd, 478 S.E.2d 201 (N.C.
1996).
147. Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I. 1989).
148. Id.
149. See Herring Gas Co., v. Magee, 813 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (S.D. Miss. 1993) ("Ifa court
finds that the limitations contained in a covenant not to compete are unreasonable, then the court
will modify the limitations so that they are reasonable."); see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
15.51 (c) (Vernon 2002):
If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, or scope of activity to
be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater restraint than is necessary to
protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, the court shall reform the
covenant to the extent necessary to cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to
time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to
impose a restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed, except that the
court may not award the promisee damages for a breach of the covenant before its
reformation and the relief granted to the promisee shall be limited to injunctive relief If
the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is to obligate the
promisor to render personal services, the promisor establishes that the promisee knew at
the time of the execution of the agreement that the covenant did not contain limitations
as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that were reasonable
and the limitations imposed a greater restraint than necessary to protect the goodwill or
other business interest of the promisee, and the promisee sought to enforce the covenant
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exercise their inherent equity powers to the
extent necessary to protect
150
the employer's legitimate business interest.
An example of the use of the Blue Pencil doctrine to rewrite a
noncompete agreement can be found in the Minnesota Supreme Court
decision of Davies v. Davies.'5' In Davies, the employee was a bail
bonds account representative for his father's firm, a position which
required a license. 52
1 The employee signed a noncompete agreement that
precluded him from "engaging in the insurance business for a period of
five years within a [fifty] mile radius of Minneapolis, St. Paul, or
Duluth."'' 53 Soon after leaving the agency, the employee 54 began
contacting the attorneys he had worked with while at the agency.1
The court rewrote the noncompete agreement, limiting it to only
one year and restricting it to only the county in which the firm did
virtually all of its business. 55 The court further edited the agreement
to
56
only include actual clients that the employee had contacted.
The underlying reasoning for allowing a court to rewrite terms is
that the parties have reached a basic agreement that the employee will
be
57
restricted in some manner after the employment relationship ends. 1
to a greater extent than was necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee, the court may award the promisor the costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees, actually and reasonably incurred by the promisor in defending the action
to enforce the covenant.
150. Durapin,
559
A.2d
at
1058;
Westwind
Techs.,
Inc.
v.
Jones,
925 So. 2d 166, 173 (Ala. 2005) ("It is clear from our caselaw that, if a covenant not to compete is
overbroad, it is within the power of the courts to narrow it." (citing Kershaw v. Knox Kershaw, Inc.,
523 So. 2d 351, 359 (Ala.1988))).
151. 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 n., 132 (Minn. 1980).
152. Id. at 129.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 130.
155. Id. at 131.
156. Id. at 132.
157. See Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlman, 578 P.2d 530, 540 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)
(citing Wood v. May, 438 P.2d 587, 591 (Wash. 1968)). The Wood court noted:
If a sharply defined line separated a restraint which is excessive territorially from
such restraint as is permissible, there seems no reason why effect should not be given to
a restrictive promise indivisible in terms, to the extent that it is lawful. If it be said that
the attempt to impose an excessive restraint invalidates the whole promise, a similar
attempt should invalidate a whole contract, though the promises are in terms divisible.
Questions involving legality of contracts should not depend on form. Public policy
surely is not concerned to distinguish differences of wording in agreements of identical
meaning.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE
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Whether a jurisdiction uses the blue pencil doctrine solely to
eliminate an unreasonable term, or it allows a court to rewrite the
agreement, the doctrine is generally a discretionary tool.158 In both types

of jurisdictions, courts note that clear overreaching on the part of the
employer may preclude a later argument for use of the Blue Pencil
doctrine.1 59 As one court stated, the Blue Pencil doctrine should be used
"unless circumstances indicate bad faith or deliberate overreaching on
the part of the [employer]." 6 °
V.

ANALYSIS

Let us return to, and expand upon, our opening hypothetical:
Soon after starting with ABC, Sam Salesperson lands a major
account in Philadelphiaforhisfirst sale. Soon afterward, he lands
several other major Philadelphiaaccounts due to word of mouth
and references within the Philadelphiamedical community. Sam is
soon spending all of his time maintaining and developing these
major accounts and making a good living doing so. ABC hires
other salespeople to market in the rest of Pennsylvania and in
New Jersey. Three years later, Sam leaves ABC to work for a
LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1660, at 4683 (rev. ed. 1937)).
158. See, e.g., Hilligoss v. Cargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Minn. 2002) (noting that in
rejecting the employer's contention that the doctrine should have been used to make the agreement
reasonable, the Blue Pencil Doctrine may be used at the discretion of the court); Klick v. Crosstown
State Bank of Ham Lake, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the lower
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to apply the Blue Pencil doctrine to the contract,
because the agreement was used to keep the employee from leaving and not to prevent unfair
competition).
159. See Arpac Corp. v. Murray, 589 N.E.2d 640, 652 (III. App. Ct. 1992) ("Although a circuit
court is not prohibited from modifying restraints embodied in an employment contract, the fairness
of the restraint initially imposed is a relevant consideration of the court in equity."); Kayem v.
Stewart, No. M2002-01515-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22309466, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2003)
("[Ulnless the circumstances indicate bad faith on the part of the employer, a court will enforce
covenants not to compete to the extent they are reasonably necessary to protect the employer's
interest ... " (citing Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984))).
160. Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I. 1989); see also Data Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988) ("The third approach, and the one we adopt, is to
hold that if an overbroad covenant not to compete can be reasonably altered to render it enforceable,
then the court shall do so unless it determines the covenant was not drafted in good faith. The
burden of proving that the covenant was drafted in good faith is on the employer."); Estee Lauder
Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that a court may sever terms and
partially enforce the agreement if "the employer demonstrates an absence of overreaching, coercive
use of dominant bargaining power, or other anti-competitive misconduct, but has in good faith
sought to protect a legitimate business interest, consistent with reasonable standards of fair
dealing.").
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competitor.

Is it fair to find the geographic limitation in the noncompete
unreasonablebecause Sam only sold in Philadelphia?Would it be
fair to Sam to preclude him from selling in all of Pennsylvaniaand
New Jersey?

Even assuming all other terms are reasonable, a close analysis of
the geographic limitation in this hypothetical shows the inadequacy of
the current approaches. Also, it underscores the need for noncompete
agreements to become malleable documents that adjust along with the
employee's duties. Each of the three current approaches is addressed
below, but first, a preliminary question - one that is rarely ever explicitly
addressed by courts - must be raised: At what point do we look at the
reasonableness of the terms of the noncompete agreement?
The two options are, of course, to look at the reasonableness of the
agreement at the time it was signed or at the time the employment
relationship ended. While the question is rarely explicitly addressed, its
resolution is critical to an evaluation of the reasonableness of a
noncompete agreement.' 16 It also brings to bear the impact that a
jurisdiction's rule should play in the overall remedial scheme, in the
context of consideration for noncompete agreements that are signed after
commencement of employment.
A. JurisdictionsUsing the "Agreement Void" Rule

In jurisdictions utilizing the "all-or-nothing" approach, the point at
which the reasonableness of the agreement is determined is crucial. If a
court analyzing the above hypothetical were to look at the
reasonableness of the agreement at the time the employment relationship
ended, it would certainly find the agreement unreasonable, as the

161. Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002) ("[A] covenant not to
compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time
), with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (2002) ("An employer may
the agreement is made ....
obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant which protects an employer's reasonable
competitive business interests and expressly prohibits an employee from engaging in employment
or a line of business after termination of employment if the agreement or covenant is reasonable as
to its duration, geographical area, and the type of employment or line of business."), and WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 103.465 (West 2002) (noting that a noncompete is lawful and enforceable only if the
restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary). Both the Michigan and Wisconsin statutes, while
not explicitly directing, indicate that the agreement is be analyzed as to the applicable facts at the
time of termination of employment.
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geographic limitation is far greater than necessary to protect its
legitimate business interests. In an all-or-nothing jurisdiction, Sam
Salesperson would be free to call on his current customers immediately.
If a court were to look at the reasonableness of the agreement at the
time it was signed, it would find the geographic term reasonable, as
ABC and Sam certainly envisioned sales throughout the territory. The
result would be that Sam would not only be barred from calling on his
Philadelphia customers, but would also be unfairly precluded from
selling in the rest of Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
These divergent outcomes underscore the need to incorporate a
jurisdiction's rule on consideration for noncompete agreements signed
after commencement of employment into the overall remedy analysis. If
the reasonableness of the agreement as of the time the employment
relationship ended no longer exists, which is common, then employers
must have the ability to easily alter the noncompete agreement so that
the terms reflect an employee's current duties and responsibilities. It is
unrealistic in many employment situations to expect the employer to be
able to accurately predict the scope of an employee's duties in five, ten,
or more years down the road. Territories and customer bases may
expand or shrink, new products may be added or the employee may end
up focusing on only a few of the employer's products, and technologies
and general duties may change. It is unrealistic to require new
consideration each time a change takes place. A better approach, as
presented below, is to foster a system in which the employer and
employee, with adequate safeguards, are encouraged to regularly review
and update the noncompete agreement to accurately reflect the
employee's duties.
B. JurisdictionsEmploying the Blue Pencil "Knockout'"Rule
The Blue Pencil "knockout" method is also problematic, as it is
unclear how this approach can work as a practical matter with many key
noncompete terms. Courts using this method often emphatically state
that they do not have the power to rewrite contractual provisions. 162
However, if key terms are simply knocked out, the agreement itself may
162. See, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc)
("[T]he court cannot create a new agreement for the parties to uphold the contract."); Moore v.
Midwest Distrib., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) ("Our supreme court further stated
'that the court would not vary the terms of a written agreement between the parties; to do so would
mean that the court would be making a new contract, and it has consistently held that this will not
be done."' (quoting Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Ark. 1999))).
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be unenforceable as a practical matter. For example, in our hypothetical
a court could not simply knock out the geographical limitation because
the noncompete would then read so as to preclude Sam Salesperson from
selling anywhere for two years. Certainly the intended consequence of
finding a geographic limitation unreasonable is not to extend the
prohibition indefinitely. The agreement is simply unenforceable without
the geographic limitation.
Of the three primary terms in a noncompete agreement (temporal,
geographic, and occupational), the temporal and geographic limitations
are required terms. While, occasionally, a portion of the occupational
limitation can be knocked out, the temporal and geographic terms must
be included. For example, if ABC's noncompete agreement precluded
Sam Salesperson from marketing software and hardware to ABC's
customers, the term "and hardware" could be eliminated and the
agreement can still be enforced. However, the parties must know for
how long and in what territory Sam is precluded from selling software
for the agreement to be workable and enforceable.
C. JurisdictionsUsing the Blue Pencil "Rewrite" Rule
On the surface, allowing a court to rewrite in reasonable provisions
to make them usable seems to be the most equitable as to the final
outcome. Employers receive the protection they contracted for and
employees are only restricted to the extent necessary to protect the
employer's legitimate business interest. However, there are legitimate
concerns over this approach.
First of all, the rewrite approach does nothing to discourage
employers from seeking the broadest possible protections at the
commencement of the noncompete agreement because the employer can
rely on the court to rein in any excesses. While an employer's fervor can
be tempered by a rule requiring good faith in the drafting, the reality is
that many of the occupations in which noncompete agreements are most
common and needed-sales and "customer contact" positions-begin
without either the employer or employee knowing where the sales and
customer contact leads and developments will take the employee. As
such, most employers would have at least a reasonable argument for a
fairly broad noncompete agreement.
This "good faith" analysis also brings us back to the initial question
posed in this section: at what point do we judge the reasonableness of
the agreement? If we are to look at the reasonableness at the time of
drafting then we must give employers leeway in predicting the scope of
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol24/iss2/2

32

Swift: Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils: Judicial an
2007]

Judicialand Legislative Handlingof Noncompete Agreements

255

the employee's duties at some time in the future. Further, when
reasonableness at the time of drafting is the issue, an analysis of the
"good faith" of the employer is rife with potential problems of proof,
particularly with regard to those employees who have been with the
employer for a significant period of time. It is easy to conceive of a
situation where an experienced salesperson/customer contact employee
who has been with an employer for ten years was initially trained and
managed by employees that have long since left the company. As such,
it often may be difficult to determine whether the original limitations in
the noncompete agreement were reasonable based upon the employer's
expectation of the employee at the time of hire.
Further, the in terrorem effect of a noncompete agreement,
espoused by Professor Blake 163 and noted by numerous courts, should
not be discounted. Many employees will, when faced with even
unreasonable noncompete agreement terms, choose simply to honor the
agreement due to their lack of legal knowledge and/or fear of lawsuits
and accompanying expenses. As such, employers should be discouraged
from overreaching in the initial drafting of the noncompete agreement.
Finally, the hesitancy of courts to create terms of an agreement that
differ from those agreed upon by the parties is well-founded. Courts
should interpret contracts, not create them. A better policy, as discussed
above, is to create a system that encourages employers and employees to
regularly review and update noncompete agreements.
In sum, each of the three responses to unreasonable terms is flawed.
Voiding an entire agreement for an unreasonable term, while the best
method to discourage overreaching by employers, is potentially unfair,
particularly to employers who act in good faith at the time of drafting
but are unable to precisely determine the scope of the employee's duties
as they evolve over the employment relationship. Eliminating an
unreasonable term is unworkable for too many agreements because some
terms are necessary for the agreement to function; it is inequitable to
allow some agreements to be "saved" simply because the employer was
fortunate enough to overreach on a term that can be severed. Finally,
allowing judicial modification of the agreement rests too much power in
the employer's drafting; it allows the employer to seek maximum
protection with the knowledge that the court will cure any deficiencies.

163.

See Blake, supra note 2 at 682.
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VI. PROPOSED NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT REMEDY STATUTE

The following proposed scheme is designed to encourage
employers and employees to reach noncompete agreements at the
commencement of employment and then regularly review and update the
agreement to reflect the employee's duties. This scheme also takes into
account the important role that the rules pertaining to consideration
should play in creating a fair and equitable remedy for unreasonable
terms in a noncompete agreement.
1. Consideration
a. If signed prior to the commencement of employment, no
additional consideration is required. 164
b. If the noncompete agreement is signed after the
commencement of employment, consideration beyond
continued employment must be given by the employer.

c. This consideration must be directly linked to the signing
of the noncompete agreement and must include one or
more of the following:
i. A one-time bonus equaling or exceeding 5% of
the employee's salary;
ii. A permanent pay raise equaling or exceeding
3% of the employee's salary;
iii. For a salesperson: an expanded territory or other
marketing opportunities, including additional
products or services, which carry a reasonable
expectation for a permanent pay increase
equaling or exceeding 3% of the employee's
salary; or
iv. A promotion which includes a significant
164. This is the standard rule, followed by all jurisdictions. E.g., Modern Controls, Inc. v.
Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1978).
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65

increase in title and responsibility. 1

2. Alteration of an Existing Noncompete Agreement
a.

If a valid noncompete agreement is in place between
employer and employee, no additional consideration is
necessary for the parties to agree to alter the terms of the
agreement.

b. If an employer wishes to alter a noncompete agreement,
the employer must present the noncompete agreement in
writing to the employee, with the employee's rights and
responsibilities clearly stated and the changes clearly
identified. 166
c.

Once the employee is presented with the altered
noncompete agreement, the employee has twenty-one
days to:
i. Sign the noncompete agreement as presented;
ii. Present a counter-proposal to the employer; or
iii. Refuse

to

sign

the

altered

noncompete

165. The reasoning behind section l(b) is to strongly encourage employers to present
noncompete agreements to prospective employees for signing prior to commencement of
employment. This rule recognizes that an employee who is presented with a noncompete agreement
after commencement of employment is in a very difficult predicament in which the employee has
very little bargaining power. This rule requires a significant financial outlay on the part of the
employer to support an agreement after commencement of employment.
The rule does, however, provide a reasonable alternative for the employer who wants to
promote an employee in-house. Such might be the case with an administrative employee or factory
or warehouse employee who wants to move into a sales or executive position. The rule allows for
the significant promotion itself to provide the required consideration. In addition, such a promotion
would almost always entail a significant pay raise (or at least the possibility of a pay raise due to
commissions).
166. While it may, at first blush, seem unreasonable to require a new agreement, creating the
new agreement should be relatively straightforward and require little supervision from the attorney
who originally drafted the agreement. The manager would only need to alter the pertinent provisions
of the documents to coincide more accurately with the employee's current duties. This may require,
for example, altering the geographic term to coincide with current geographic territory or customer
list, or adding or deleting product lines, any of which can be accomplished by a manager. Further,
the document itself can be incorporated into the employee's regular performance review, so as to
make the experience less confrontational.
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agreement.167
3. Remedy for an Unreasonable Term
a.

If the parties have a signed agreement and the court
finds a term to be unreasonable, the agreement
is VOID,
68
subject to section (b) of this subdivision.

b. If the parties have a signed agreement, the employer has
presented an altered agreement to the employee and the
employee refused to sign the agreement or the parties
were unable to reach an agreement following a counterproposal from the employee, the court may, in its
discretion, use the Blue Pencil doctrine to cross out an
unreasonable term(s) and replace it with a reasonable
term. In determining if it should utilize the Blue Pencil
doctrine, the court should consider:
i. The reasonableness of the signed agreement;
ii. The reasonableness of the un-signed, altered
agreement; and/or
iii. The reasonableness of the employee's counterproposal, if any. 169

167. This section allows an employer to alter the terms of an existing noncompete agreement
without the need for additional consideration. The reasoning behind this rule is twofold. First, the
employer and the employee have already agreed upon some protection for the employer at the
termination of the employment relationship. Second, and in conjunction with the terms in
subdivision 3, the employer has the ability and the obligation to regularly monitor the noncompete
agreement to ensure that it is reasonable in light of the employee's current duties.
168. This rule provides the maximum protection for employees, as employers must craft
noncompete agreements that are not overly broad, protect only legitimate business interests and
monitor those agreements regularly to ensure that an employee's changing work duties are
accurately reflected in the agreement.
169. This section allows for court flexibility in situations where an employer attempts to alter
an existing noncompete agreement, but the employee and employer are not able to agree on altered
terms. The court may take into consideration an employer's attempt to alter the terms of a
noncompete agreement to coincide with an employee's current duties. This section also encourages
employees to actively work to reach an agreement with their employer. If an employer has acted in
good faith and attempted to update the agreement to coincide with the employee's duties, the court
should use the Blue Pencil doctrine to revise any unreasonable terms to make them reasonable.
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CONCLUSION

Employer-employee noncompete agreement litigation is not going
away. The agreements are too important to employers, too burdensome
on employees, and too fact intensive to be eliminated. Courts-and in
particular, legislative bodies-should consider the important policy
considerations when choosing a remedy for unreasonable terms in a
noncompete agreement. Furthermore, the role of consideration in the
remedy scheme should be considered to create a scheme that encourages
regular review and updating of the noncompete agreement between
employers and employees.
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